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With the opening of borders to trade and foreign investment, globalization brings opportunities and pressures for domestic firms in emerging market 
economies to improve their competitive position. Whereas considerable attention 
has been paid to the effects of globalization on productivity of firms in emerging 
market economies,1 very little is known about the mechanisms through which hori-
zontal and vertical relationships with foreign firms and international trade improve 
efficiency in domestic firms. Innovation is a presumed conduit through which glo-
balization affects productivity, yet there is little research testing the relationship 
between globalization and innovation. In this paper, we examine the impact of com-
petition from, and linkages with, foreign firms on innovation by domestic firms in 
emerging market economies. We use several measures of innovation, akin to the 
broad measures of managerial innovation pursued by Nicholas Bloom and John Van 
1 Various literatures examine the impact of globalization on efficiency of firms in emerging markets. For a 
review of the literature on foreign direct investment, see Holger Görg and David Greenaway (2004). For a review 
of the trade literature, see Joachim Wagner (2007).
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Globalization and Innovation in Emerging Markets†
By Yuriy Gorodnichenko, Jan Svejnar, and Katherine Terrell*
Globalization brings opportunities and pressures for domestic 
firms in emerging markets to innovate and improve their competi-
tive position. Using data from 27 emerging market economies, we 
estimate the effects of foreign competition and linkages with foreign 
firms on innovation by domestic firms. We provide robust evidence 
of a positive relationship between foreign competition and innova-
tion, broadly defined. The supply chain of multinational enterprises 
and trade are also important channels. There is no evidence for an 
inverted U relationship between innovation and foreign competition. 
Moreover, the relationship between globalization and innovation 
does not differ across the manufacturing and service sectors. (JEL 
F02, F23, M16, O33)
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Reenen (2007) and Ann Bartel, Casey Ichniowski, and Kathryn Shaw (2007) in the 
context of advanced economies.
Several models are particularly relevant for our empirical work. They assume 
that two broad mechanisms are important determinants of the level of innovation in 
a firm: knowledge transfers and competition, which may be brought about through 
various channels, including the entry of foreign firms (foreign direct investment—
FDI) and international trade. A recent model by John Sutton (2007a) focuses on 
knowledge transfers, while works from Joseph A. Schumpeter (1943) to Philippe 
Aghion et al. (2004, 2005) focus on competition.
In Sutton’s (2007a) model, a firm’s competitiveness depends not only on its pro-
ductivity but also on the quality of its product, with productivity and quality jointly 
determining a firm’s “capability.” An important prediction of this model is that after 
an initial shakeout phase, firms in emerging markets will strive to adjust by raising 
their capabilities.2 Sutton suggests that the process will be influenced by the verti-
cal transfer of capabilities to the emerging market economies through the supply 
chain of multinational enterprises (MNEs), an argument also present in the inter-
national business literature on FDI that we discuss below.3 In a parallel to Sutton’s 
work, there is a large literature asking whether exporting and importing activities of 
domestic firms raise their efficiency—presumably through innovations induced by 
the exposure of the domestic firms to more advanced practices and technologies (see 
Wagner 2007). In line with Sutton’s conceptual framework and the trade literature, 
we test whether or not firms in emerging markets that enter the supply chain with 
foreign firms, or export and import, increase their innovative activities.
The second broad literature on the effects of globalization emphasizes the rela-
tionship between product market competition and innovation by incumbent firms. 
Many economists since Kenneth J. Arrow (1962) have traditionally argued that 
competition is good for an economy by providing incentives for efficient organiza-
tion of production, putting downward pressure on costs, and motivating innovation. 
On the other hand, Schumpeter (1943) argued that large firms operating in concen-
trated markets are the most powerful engine of progress, and the most likely to inno-
vate, because they can more easily appropriate the returns from inventive activity. 
Similarly, Paul Romer (1990) and Aghion and Peter Howitt (1992), among others, 
stress that product market competition reduces monopoly rents that induce innova-
tion. Recently, Aghion et al. (2004, 2005) have shown that the effect of competition 
on firms’ or industries’ willingness to innovate depends on their level of efficiency 
(technology). In particular, competition is expected to spur innovation by firms close 
2 This first shakeout phase has also been referred to as the reallocative effects of trade liberalization and entry 
of foreign firms. For a theoretical and empirical paper focusing on the reallocative effects, see Marc J. Melitz 
(2003) and Nina Pavcnik (2002), respectively. These works suggest that globalization can raise the aggregate 
productivity via adjustments on the extensive margin (the exit of inefficient firms) rather than the intensive mar-
gin (productivity enhancements of incumbent firms). In the present study, we will be observing the effects on the 
remaining incumbent firms and examining the importance of adjustment on the intensive margin. 
3 Interestingly, from the standpoint of our research, Sutton argues that “… it is the ‘middle group’ countries 
of Eastern Europe, along with China and India, who are best placed to be the most dramatic beneficiaries of the 
present globalization, not—or not primarily—because of trade liberalization per se, but because of the virtuous 
dynamic that follows as part of the general package of liberalization of foreign direct investment and capability 
transfer.” (Sutton 2007a, F483)
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to the efficient frontier (those with highest efficiency), while it discourages innova-
tion by firms that are far from the frontier. In Aghion et al. (2004), the predictions 
arise from a Schumpeterian model in which incumbent firms that are closer to the 
frontier have an incentive to innovate when faced with a potential (foreign) entrant in 
order to retain their market. Firms that are far from the frontier cannot compete with 
the more efficient entrant and competition simply reduces their expected benefits 
from innovation. Competition thus provides incentives for innovation for the more 
efficient domestic firms and a disincentive for the less efficient ones.
A slightly different argument is presented in Aghion et al. (2005), which states 
that firms close to the efficiency frontier are spurred by competition to innovate 
and increase their efficiency because competition reduces their pre-innovation 
rents (rents obtained if the firms do not innovate). Innovation enables these effi-
cient firms to escape competition and increase their post-innovation rents or main-
tain them at their previous levels. In contrast, competition discourages firms that 
are far from the frontier from innovating because it negatively affects their post-
innovation rents. Innovation does not help these laggard firms escape competi-
tion.4 The balance between the opposing effects of competition on the two types 
of firms enables Aghion et al. (2004, 2005) to derive the prediction that the effect 
of the intensity of product market competition on the extent of innovation is in the 
form of an inverted U.
Based on these models, we test the following ceteris paribus predictions:
 (i) Globalization brings foreign competition to emerging markets, and the antici-
pated effect of this competition on innovation by domestic firms depends on 
the underlying theoretical model:
 a. The effect of competition on innovation is negative.
 b. The effect of competition on innovation is positive.
 c. The effect of competition on innovation is in the form of inverted U.
 d. The effect of competition on innovation is positive for firms that are close 
to the efficiency frontier, and negative for firms that are far from the 
frontier.
 (ii) Globalization stimulates innovation by domestic firms in emerging market 
economies through the vertical transfer of capabilities. Specifically:
 a. Firms that supply a larger share of sales to MNEs innovate more than 
firms that sell more to the domestic market.
 b. Firms that export a larger share of their sales innovate more than firms 
that sell more to the domestic market.
 c. Firms that import a larger share of their inputs innovate more than firms 
that buy a larger share of their inputs on the domestic market.
4 In the model, the proportion of laggard and efficient firms is endogenous and depends on equilibrium innova-
tion intensities. When competition is low, there is a larger fraction of efficient (neck-and-neck competing) incum-
bent firms and the “escape-competition” effect is likely to dominate the Schumpeterian effect. When competition 
is high, there is a larger fraction of laggard firms with low profits, and the Schumpeterian (negative) effect of 
competition on innovation is likely to dominate. 
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In testing the above hypotheses, we make several contributions. First, we focus 
on innovation, which has not been greatly studied in emerging markets, rather than 
on gains in productivity, which has been widely studied. This shift in focus is desir-
able because theories usually make predictions about the effects on innovation by 
firms rather than about the (derived) productivity effect. Furthermore, as argued by 
Gorodnichenko (2008), measured productivity captures the revenue generating abil-
ity of firms (which includes both market power and technology level) rather than the 
technology level of firms. Second, our analysis nests various channels of globaliza-
tion, and we can assess the relative importance of different aspects of globalization 
for innovative activity of firms in emerging markets. Importantly, in contrast to the 
literature, we utilize information on direct linkages of domestic firms with foreign 
firms (e.g., whether a domestic firm is a supplier to foreign firms) instead of the typi-
cal measures of vertical linkages at the industry level, which rely on input-output 
tables (e.g., Beata Smarzynska Javorcik 2004). Third, we exploit a unique unified 
survey covering over 11,500 firms in a broad array of sectors in 27 countries. Thus, 
unlike other studies, we are able to analyze firms in both manufacturing and ser-
vices and exploit cross-country variation.5
Our main findings are: greater pressure from foreign competition stimulates 
innovation; vertical relationships (supplying multinationals as well as exporting and 
importing) induce innovation by domestic firms; there is no evidence for an inverted 
U relationship between innovation and competition in either the more efficient or 
laggard firms, and the relationship between globalization and innovation does not 
vary across the manufacturing and service sectors. These findings are very robust.
The paper is organized as follows. We begin in Section I by describing our data 
and econometric specification. Section II presents the estimates of our baseline spec-
ification, which tests the main hypotheses (i) a–c and (ii) a–c. In Section III, we con-
front issues of endogeneity and carry out robustness checks. Among other things, we 
construct a measure of barriers to entry from survey responses; validate this index 
using external information on firm survival, turnover, and profitability rates; and 
use the index as an instrumental variable for foreign pressure. Upon tackling these 
issues, we proceed with testing the more nuanced hypothesis (i)d in Section IV, as 
well as examining whether the globalization-innovation relationship is significantly 
different for the manufacturing and service sectors. Section V concludes the paper.
I.  Data and Econometric Specification
To test the predictions outlined in the previous section, we use data from the 2002 
and 2005 Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), a 
joint initiative of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 
and the World Bank Group. These are large surveys of 6,500 firms in 2002, and 
7,900 firms in 2005, in 27 transition countries.6 An important feature is the inclusion 
5 In the working paper version (Gorodnichenko, Svejnar, and Terrell 2008), we use the cross-country variation 
in these data to examine the importance of business climate and institutional factors for innovation. We find that 
these factors have small, if any, quantitative effects. 
6 In both years, the surveys were administered to 15 countries from Central and Eastern Europe (Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, 
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of firms in the service sector, which is the new dynamic (yet understudied) sector in 
these economies. The surveys relied on the same sampling frames and used identi-
cal questionnaires in all countries. To ensure that the samples are representative 
of the relevant population of firms, the surveys used stratified random sampling. 
For example, in each country, the sectoral composition of the sample in terms of 
manufacturing7 versus services8 was determined by their relative contribution to 
gross domestic product (GDP). Firms that operate in sectors subject to government 
price regulation and prudential supervision, such as banking, electric power, rail 
transport, and water and waste water were excluded from the sample. The sample 
includes very small firms with as few as two employees and firms with up to 10,000 
employees. Moreover, the data include firms in the rural areas as well as large cities. 
Hence, these data enable us to analyze diverse firms in a large number of countries.
In addition, the dataset contains a panel component, where 1,443 firms that were 
surveyed in 2002 were surveyed again in 2005.9 We use these panel data for robust-
ness checks, where we verify that the timing of the values of variables in our base-
line econometric specifications does not affect our results. However, our analysis 
relies primarily on the pooled 2002 and 2005 data since many variables of interest 
have a retrospective component in each survey date, and because it is hard to detect 
robust relationships with a small panel of heterogeneous firms, especially when we 
use many control variables.
An important advantage of our data is that firms self-report various types of inno-
vation activity. Hence, we are able to define innovation broadly as the development 
and upgrading of new products, adoption of new technologies or obtaining quality 
accreditation. Specifically, we use binary variables based on answers to the ques-
tion about whether firms have undertaken any of the following initiatives in the 
last three years: successfully developed a major new product line or upgraded an 
existing product line, hereafter New Product; acquired new production technology, 
hereafter New Technology; obtained a new quality accreditation (such as ISO 9001, 
9002 or 14000, AGCCP, etc.),  hereafter New Accreditation.
Given that the respondent’s determination of whether a new product or service 
was developed or upgraded is subjective, we also use the variable New Accreditation 
as a formal affirmation that the quality of the product has been upgraded according 
to some widely accepted standards. For example, ISO 9000 is a family of standards 
for quality management systems, maintained by the International Organization for 
Standardization and administered by accreditation and certification bodies.10 In 
Poland, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia), 11 countries from the former Soviet 
Union (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine 
and Uzbekistan) and Turkey. In neither year could the survey be administered in Turkmenistan. The analytical 
data include only about 11,500 firms due to missing observations in variables of interest.
7 Manufacturing includes mining and quarrying, construction, manufacturing, and agro-processing.
8 Service sector includes: transportation, storage, and communications; wholesale, retail, repairs; real estate, 
business services; hotels and restaurants; other community, social, and personal activities; and commerce.
9 The relatively small size of the panel should not be associated with intensive exit of firms in these countries. 
The exit rate was about 8 percent (average across countries). The size of the panel is mainly brought about by a 
refusal of firms to participate in the new wave of the survey (42 percent) and an inability to reach eligible respond-
ers within firms (25 percent). 
10 Although the standards originated in manufacturing during WWII, when there were quality problems in 
many British high-tech industries, they are now employed across a wide range of sectors. A “product,” in ISO 
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order to ensure the quality of a product, the standards certify the process by which a 
product is manufactured or delivered.11 Hence, New Accreditation captures “process 
innovation” as well as “product/service innovation.”
These measures of innovation are an improvement over the more commonly used 
measures of patents and R&D expenditures. Patents are generally viewed as having 
three weaknesses. First, they measure inventions rather than innovations. Second, 
the tendency to patent varies across countries, industries, and processes. Third, 
firms often protect their innovations by using methods other than patents (maintain-
ing technological complexity, industrial secrecy, and lead time over competitors). 
Using R&D expenditures may also be inappropriate because not all innovations 
are generated by R&D expenditures, R&D does not necessarily lead to innovation 
(it is an input rather than output), and formal R&D measures are biased against 
small firms (Jonathan Michie 1998; Daniele Archibugi and Giorgio Sirilli 2001). 
More important from the point of view of this paper is that these types of innova-
tions are less likely to be observed in emerging market economies. Domestic firms 
are expected to engage more in imitation and adaptation of already created and 
tested technologies, rather than generating new inventions or expending resources 
on R&D. This is substantiated in our data, where the vast majority (75 percent) of 
firms who answered that they acquired a new technology said that it was embodied 
in new machinery or equipment that was purchased or licensed from other sources. 
Only 17 percent said the technology was developed by the firm.12 Perhaps, most 
importantly, the measures we use capture management innovations, which can be 
argued to be more important than inventions for improving a firm’s competitiveness 
and efficiency.
The BEEPS data also permit us to capture, at the firm level, the effects of pressure 
from foreign competition. In particular, we use responses about the severity of for-
eign competition, expressed by the chief executive officer of the firm on a 1–4 scale, 
from “not important” to “very important.” (See a description of this and all the other 
variables in Appendix Table A1.) We note that this variable captures the pressure 
that domestic firms feel from local production by foreign firms in their markets and 
imports competing with their products.
We use three variables for vertical linkages between domestic and foreign firms, 
which allow transfer of capabilities or knowledge spillovers: sMNE, the share of a 
firm’s sales to multinational enterprises; Exports, the share of sales exported; and 
imports, the share of inputs imported. Whereas sMNE can be construed as captur-
ing downstream relationships with foreign firms within the country, Exports can be 
viewed as capturing downstream relationships with foreign firms outside the country.
vocabulary, can mean a physical object or a service.
11 For example, the requirements in ISO 9001 include: a set of procedures that cover all key processes in 
the business; monitoring processes to ensure they are effective; keeping adequate records; checking output for 
defects, with appropriate corrective action where necessary; regularly reviewing individual processes and the 
quality system itself for effectiveness; and facilitating continual improvement. 
12 One may be concerned that a vast majority of new technology is due to imitation and wonder whether our 
results extend to genuine in-house innovations made within firms. We applied our econometric specification 
(discussed below) to two in-house measures of innovation—positive R&D expenditures and “new technology 
developed by the firm”—and found very similar effects. 
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To test whether firms that are further away from the efficiency frontier innovate 
less than firms that are closer to the frontier, we define the frontier as the best (the 
most efficient one-third of) foreign firms (within an industry, country and year) in 
terms of measured productivity, and then calculate each domestically-owned firm’s 
distance from the frontier. We would like to use total factor productivity (TFP, which 
we compute in equation (2)) to measure the distance from the frontier because it is 
the most intuitive measure. However, since firms are reluctant to report levels of 
sales, capital, and other key variables, we can only compute TFP for less than one-
half of the firms in our sample. Hence, we use distance from the frontier based on 
TFP in our robustness check, but, in our baseline specifications, we propose an alter-
native measure of distance that allows us to keep the sample size as large as possible.
Our alternative distance measure draws on the matching literature (e.g., Paul R. 
Rosenbaum 2002), which assumes that firms that are similar in a set of observed 
characteristics are likely to have similar efficiency. Conversely, if the observed char-
acteristics of domestic firms are different from those of the best (in terms of TFP) 
foreign-owned firms, the domestic firms are likely to be less efficient than the best 
foreign-owned firms. Specifically, we measure the distance between a domestically-
owned firm i and the leading foreign-owned firms in an industry and country with 
the Mahalanobis distance, equal to
 distancei = minj∈F U Q x  i d −  x  j F R ' S x −1 Q x i d −  x j F RV,
where superscript F denotes the best foreign-owned firms, j indexes the best foreign-
owned firms, and superscript d denotes domestic companies. Sx is the covariance 
matrix of the vector of observed characteristics x. The inverse of the covariance 
matrix of observable characteristics x works as a weighting matrix, which takes into 
account the correlations between variables (no double counting) and makes the units 
of measurement and relative variability in x irrelevant. For example, if x consists of 
two uncorrelated variables, capacity utilization (cU  ) and employment (L ), and there 
is only one foreign firm, then the distance from the frontier for a domestic firm i is 
distancei = (cUi − cU  F  )2/var (cU  ) + (Li − LF  )2/var (L ), where cU  F is capacity 
utilization of the foreign firm, LF is employment of the foreign firm, and var (cU ) 
and var (L ) are the variance of capacity utilization and employment in the sample, 
respectively. If there is more than one foreign firm embodying the frontier, we take 
the distance to the closest foreign firm.
The vector of observed characteristics x contains the size of the firm in terms of 
the logarithm of number of employees; the structure of employment in terms of educa-
tional attainment (share with vocational school, secondary school, college), skill level 
(classified by BEEPS), as well as share of managers, share of professional workers, 
and share of permanent workers; capacity utilization in terms of machinery and labor; 
markup; share owned by largest shareholder(s); and growth rates (of sales revenue and 
capital). Domestic firms are matched only to foreign-owned firms in the same indus-
try, country, and year. Since the distance is skewed, we take log (1 + distance) as the 
distance from the frontier in our specification. The larger the Mahalanobis distance, 
the further the domestic firm is from the best foreign firms in its industry/country.
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As may be seen from Figure 1, the Mahalanobis distance is correlated with the 
TFP-based distance. The raw correlation between the variables is 0.21, which is 
substantial given the amount of heterogeneity observed in the data. Furthermore, 
the correlation remains almost equally strong, even after we control for other fac-
tors such as industry, country, and time fixed effects. Hence, although conceptually, 
perhaps, less appealing than the TFP-based distance,13 the Mahalanobis distance is 
a reasonably good proxy for distance from the frontier.
We estimate the following baseline probit specification with the pooled data 
in the 2002 and 2005 BEEPS for domestically owned firms (i.e., with no foreign 
ownership):
(1) iisct = Φ {α1Forcompisct + β0 sMNEisct + β1 Exportisct + β2 importisct
 + δ1 log (1 + distanceisct) + γ0 ln Lisc,t−3 + γ1 (ln Lisc,t−3)2 + γ2 Eduisc,t−3
 + γ3 skillisc,t−3 + γ5 Ageisct+ γ6 cNMisct + γ8 soEisct + ψLocisct
 + γ9 Markupisct + λs + ϑc + ωt + error },
13 Admittedly, the similarity of observed characteristics does not always imply that firms have the same level 
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Distance to the frontier: TFP
Figure 1. Alternative Measures of Distance: Mahalanobis versus TFP-Based
Notes: The figure plots distance from the frontier measured by Mahalanobis (vertical axis) and 
measured by TFP (horizontal axis). All measures of distance are on log scale. Each point rep-
resents a firm observation. TFP is computed as in equation (2). Solid line is the fitted regression 
line. Correlation between these two measures is 0.21.
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where i is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm reported an innovation, and 
zero otherwise; Φ denotes cumulative density function of a standard normal random 
variable; and  i, s, c, and t index firms, sectors, countries, and time, respectively. 
Variables dated with period t − 3 are taken from retrospective questions about the 
firm’s performance three years prior to the current date. The first variable Forcomp 
captures pressure from foreign competition. The next three explanatory variables 
capture vertical linkages or transfer of capabilities: sMNE, the share of sales to 
multinational enterprises; Export, the share of export in sales; and import, the share 
of imported inputs.14 The variable distance is the (Mahalanobis) distance from the 
technological frontier.
In addition to sector (λs), country (ϑc), and year (ωt) fixed effects,15 the following 
variables are included to control for a number of firm-specific factors deemed to be 
important in the literature.16
L (the number of employees) and L2 measure the size of the firm. The argument 
for including size is that large companies have more resources to innovate and can 
benefit from economies of scale in R&D production and marketing.17
EdU (the share of workers with a university education) and skiLL (the share 
of skilled workers) capture human capital in the firm. These variables might be 
expected to be positively correlated with innovation if EdU reflects the involvement 
of workers in R&D, and more skilled workers (skiLL) are able to give feedback to 
the firm on how to improve a product.
Age of the firm is the log of the number of years since the firm began operations 
in the country. Two hypotheses are plausible: one suggesting that older firms devel-
oped routines that are resistant to innovation, and another suggesting that older firms 
will accumulate the knowledge necessary to innovate. There is evidence for both 
hypotheses.
cNM is a dummy equal to one if the firm competes in the national markets and 
zero otherwise (e.g., when a firm only competes in a regional or local market). We 
expect cNM to have a positive effect on innovation, given that the firm operates in 
a larger market.
State Owned Enterprise (soE) is a dummy variable equal to one if the government 
owns 50 percent or more of the firm and zero otherwise. This variable is expected 
to be negatively correlated with innovation for a variety of reasons, including a poor 
system of rewards for innovative activities in these enterprises.
Location (Loc) is a set of dummies for size of population, where the firm is oper-
ating or headquartered. This will control for potential differences in knowledge 
available in larger versus smaller cities.
14 Note that, in contrast to previous literature, we have firm-level variables describing linkages instead of 
industry-level variables (e.g., Irene Bertschek 1995 and Javorcik 2004). 
15 Controlling for industry, country, and time fixed effects is important because certain industries, countries, 
or time periods may be more prone to report introduction of new goods, technologies, and accreditation, and 
we do not want to bias our results if our regressors systematically co-vary with these episodes of more intensive 
reporting of innovative activity.
16 See Nizar Becheikh, Rejean Landry and Nabil Amara (2006) for a review of the literature on innovation.
17 This variable is probably one of the most studied firm characteristics determining innovation, in part, 
because it is also one of Schumpeter’s (1943) hypotheses. 
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Finally, we also include, in some specifications, the variable Markup, or the price-
to-cost ratio, which is used in related studies of advanced economies (e.g., Aghion 
et al. 2005 and Stephen J. Nickell 1996) to estimate the effect of competition faced 
by each firm.18 Since we focus on the effect of foreign competition, we do not use 
markup in our base specification. Nevertheless, the question arises as to whether our 
estimated coefficient on foreign competition may suffer from an omitted variable 
bias because we do not control for domestic competition or for the possibility that 
foreign firms tend to enter less competitive industries. Therefore, we also have esti-
mated regressions that include markup as an additional control variable.
In Appendix Table A1, we report a detailed description of the variables, and in 
Appendix Table A2, we report their means and standard deviations for the whole 
sample of domestically owned firms (defined as firms with zero share of foreign 
ownership). As may be seen from Appendix Table A2, there is considerable varia-
tion in the key variables.
II.  Main Findings: Baseline Specification
In this section, we present estimates of equation (1), which test the main hypoth-
eses (i) a–c and (ii) a–c described in the previous section. Our baseline specification 
for each of the three types of innovation is reported in Table 1. The first finding 
is that greater pressure from foreign competition has a positive effect on two of 
our three types of innovation, holding constant vertical linkages with foreign firms 
and a number of control variables (including markup, which does not affect any of 
the coefficients of interest). Firms feeling that pressure from foreign competition is 
“high” are more likely to upgrade their product and acquire a new technology than 
firms that feel this pressure is “not at all important.” Converted to marginal effects 
(reported in Appendix Table A3), the estimated coefficients in Table 1 indicate that 
a unit increase in foreign pressure (e.g., moving from reporting pressure is low to 
pressure has a medium effect or moving from medium to high) is associated with 
approximately 1.9 percentage points higher innovative activity in the areas of new 
product or new technology. This is a quantitatively large effect. A one standard devi-
ation increase in foreign pressure corresponds to about a 7 percent increase in the 
probability of developing a new product and a 4 percent increase in new technolo-
gy.19 However, the coefficient on foreign pressure is not statistically significant for 
new accreditation. We also estimate a specification that includes squared Forcomp 
and find that none of the coefficients on the squared terms were significantly dif-
ferent from zero. We conclude that the forces of foreign competition stimulate the 
18 Firms that charge a larger markup are deemed to have less competition. The advantage of markup over a 
market share or Herfindahl index is that it does not require a precise definition of geographic and product markets. 
Alternatively, we could have used self-reported information on the number of competitors that a firm faces locally 
and nationally, which is provided by the BEEPS data. We do not use these data since the number of firms does 
not necessarily capture competition, but rather the “reallocation effect.” As Sutton (2007b) argues, an increase 
in competition can lead to higher concentration (intensive margin) and a lower number of firms surviving in the 
market (extensive margin).
19 This number is derived as follows. The standard deviation of pressure from foreign competition is 1.121, and 
the marginal effect is 0.019 for new technology and new product. Hence, the increase in probability is 1.121 × 0.019 
= 0.021. Dividing this by the unconditional probabilities of new product (0.56) and new technology (0.3) yields 
4 (0.021/0.56 = 0.0375) and 7 (0.021/0.3 = 0.07) percent, respectively.
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processes of developing or upgrading a new product and of acquiring a new technol-
ogy but not the process of obtaining a new accreditation. There is no support for an 
inverted U relationship between foreign competition and innovation.
Vertical transfer of capability from foreign to domestic firms (stressed by Sutton 
2007a and the FDI spillover literature) is significant for all three forms of innova-
tion. As may be seen in Table 1, firms that have stronger vertical relationships with 
multinationals, either domestically (by supplying them) or out of the country (by 
exporting or importing), innovate more than firms that have weaker relationships 
with multinationals. Holding everything else constant, an increase in the share of 
sales to MNEs or foreign markets, or the share of imported inputs, by 1 percent is 
associated with increasing innovation in products by 10 to 15 percentage points, 
increasing innovation in technology by 8 to 10 percentage points, and increasing 
Table 1—Baseline Specification for All Firms
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A. New product
Competition   
 Pressure from foreign competition 0.048*** 0.113* 0.048***
(0.013) (0.069) (0.013)
 (Pressure from foreign competition)2 −0.014 
(0.014) 
Vertical transfer of capability   
 Share of sales to MNEs 0.265*** 0.263*** 0.260***
(0.069) (0.069) (0.069)
 Export share 0.298*** 0.298*** 0.296***
(0.080) (0.080) (0.080)
 Import share 0.377*** 0.376*** 0.372***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Ability   
 Distance (Mahalanobis) −0.039* −0.039* −0.040*
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Controls   
 ln L, t−3 0.128*** 0.128*** 0.129***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
 (ln L)2, t−3 −0.005 −0.005 −0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
 Share of skilled workers, t−3 0.020 0.021 0.017
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
 Share of workers with university. ed. t−3 0.233*** 0.232*** 0.230***
(0.052) (0.052) (0.052)
 Firm’s age −0.055*** −0.055*** −0.052***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
 State owned dummy −0.236*** −0.235*** −0.232***
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046)




Observations 11,078 11,078 11,078
(continued)
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innovation in accreditation by 4 to 7 percentage points (see Appendix Table A3). 
These magnitudes are economically significant since a 1 standard deviation increase 
in these variables corresponds to a 5 to 10 percent increase in innovative success. 
Vertical transfers are less influential in obtaining a new accreditation than in upgrad-
ing a product or acquiring a new technology, but overall  vertical transfers of capabil-
ity are statistically and economically strong for all types of innovation.
It is interesting to note that firms that are further away from the frontier (in terms 
of the Mahalanobis distance) are less likely to innovate in terms of developing a new 
product or acquiring new technology. Increasing the distance to foreign firms by 
one standard deviation decreases innovative activity by approximately 1 percentage 
point, which is a relatively modest amount. Distance is not significantly related to 
Table 1—Baseline Specification for All Firms (continued)
(1) (2) (3)
Panel B. New technology
Competition   
 Pressure from foreign competition 0.056*** 0.138** 0.056***
(0.013) (0.070) (0.013)
 (Pressure from foreign competition)2 −0.018 
(0.015) 
Vertical transfer of capability   
 Share of sales to MNEs 0.250*** 0.246*** 0.244***
(0.068) (0.068) (0.068)
 Export share 0.251*** 0.251*** 0.248***
(0.074) (0.074) (0.074)
 Import share 0.293*** 0.292*** 0.288***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Ability   
 Distance (Mahalanobis) −0.037* −0.037* −0.040*
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Controls   
 ln L, t−3 0.127*** 0.128*** 0.127***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
 (ln L)2, t−3 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
 Share of skilled workers, t−3 −0.016 −0.014 −0.019
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
 Share of workers with university. ed. t−3 0.203*** 0.201*** 0.200***
(0.055) (0.055) (0.055)
 Firm’s age −0.050** −0.050** −0.046**
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
 State owned dummy −0.112** −0.112** −0.108**
(0.047) (0.047) (0.048)




Observations 10,991 10,991 10,991
(continued)
206 AMEricAN EcoNoMic JoUrNAL: MAcroEcoNoMics APriL 2010
obtaining a new quality accreditation, although the sign and point estimate of the 
coefficient are similar to those for the other two types of innovation.
There are a number of interesting findings with respect to the control variables in 
Table 1. First, larger firms tend to innovate more than smaller firms, which is consis-
tent with the finding in the vast majority of studies on innovation (see e.g., Becheikh, 
Landry, and Amara 2006) and Schumpeter’s (1943) hypothesis. The size effect is lin-
ear (and with very similar coefficients) for new product and new technology, but it 
is increasing at a decreasing rate for new accreditation. Second, the effect of human 
capital varies by how it is measured. Having a higher share of skilled workers does 
Table 1—Baseline Specification for All Firms (continued)
(1) (2) (3)
Panel c. New Accreditation
Competition    
 Pressure from foreign competition 0.026 0.107 0.026
(0.017) (0.088) (0.017)
 (Pressure from foreign competition)2 −0.017 
(0.018)
Vertical transfer of capability    
 Share of sales to MNEs 0.405*** 0.402*** 0.405***
(0.076) (0.076) (0.076)
 Export share 0.470*** 0.470*** 0.471***
(0.082) (0.082) (0.082)
 Import share 0.233*** 0.232*** 0.233***
(0.051) (0.051) (0.051)
Ability    
 Distance (Mahalanobis) −0.020 −0.019 −0.019
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Controls    
 ln L, t−3 0.295*** 0.295*** 0.295***
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047)
 (ln L)2, t−3 −0.014** −0.014** −0.014**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
 Share of skilled workers, t−3 −0.098 −0.097 −0.098
(0.064) (0.064) (0.064)
 Share of workers with university. ed. t−3 0.222*** 0.220*** 0.222***
(0.072) (0.072) (0.072)
 Firm’s age 0.023 0.023 0.023
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
 State owned dummy 0.027 0.027 0.027
(0.056) (0.056) (0.056)




Observations 11,040 11,040 11,040
Notes: The table reports estimates of equation (1), where location, time, country, and industry fixed effects are 
included, but not reported. Definitions of the variables are in Appendix Table A1. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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not affect the probability of developing a new product, acquiring new technology, or 
obtaining a new accreditation. On the other hand, as the share of workers with a uni-
versity education rises, all three types of innovation are boosted. These findings stress 
the need for a highly educated labor force to improve the capabilities of the product or 
service. To take an extreme example, a firm with 100 percent of its employees having 
a university degree would be 3 to 9 percentage points more innovative than a firm with 
no university-educated employees. Third, older (more mature) firms are less likely 
to innovate with respect to product and technology, but have the same probability of 
obtaining a new accreditation as new firms. For example, a 10-year-old firm has a 5 
percentage points lower incidence of successful innovations than a newly born firm. 
Fourth, state-owned firms are 9 percentage points less likely to innovate than privately 
owned firms in terms of product and 4 percentage points less likely to innovate than 
privately owned firms in terms of technology, but they are no more or less likely to 
acquire a new accreditation. Fifth, firms that compete/operate in national markets are 
more likely to innovate in any of the three areas than firms that only compete/operate 
in a local or regional market. This may reflect both the capability of the firms operating 
in the larger national market, as well as the characteristics of the national as opposed 
to local environment. Finally, domestic competition, proxied by markup, has a posi-
tive effect on innovation, which is consistent with the results in Wendy Carlin, Mark 
Schaffer, and Paul Seabright (2004) who use an early wave of BEEPS and a similar 
econometric framework. The corresponding marginal effect of increasing markup by 
10 percentage points, which is approximately 1 standard deviation of the markup in the 
sample, is associated with a 2.1 to 2.3 percentage point increase in the probability of 
introducing a new product or a new technology (see Appendix Table A3 for marginal 
effects).20 On the other hand, product market competition does not have an effect on 
the third dimension of innovation, namely obtaining a new accreditation.
In concluding this section, we note that the coefficients on the explanatory vari-
ables are less often significant for obtaining a new accreditation than for upgrading 
a product or acquiring a new technology. However, the coefficients on downstream 
linkages with MNEs are relatively large for obtaining a new accreditation compared 
to those for the other two types of innovation. We conjecture that accreditation may 
be obtained as a precondition for either selling to MNEs or exporting. In support for 
this conjecture, Isin Guler, Mauro F. Guillén, and John Muir MacPherson (2002) cite 
evidence that multinationals prefer suppliers who are accredited in one or more of 
the family of ISO 9000 standards. Many government agencies in countries around 
the world have come to require the same of their contractors. There is also abundant 
anecdotal evidence suggesting that quality accreditation (ISO 9000) spread through 
Asia and Latin America in the early 1990s as they tried to boost their exports (see 
e.g., various issues of chemical Week in 1994 and 1995).
20 Economic theory does not provide unambiguous predictions on the sign of the relationship between com-
petition and innovation. Likewise, Morton I. Kamien, and Nancy L. Schwartz (1975) and Wesley M. Cohen and 
Richard C. Levin (1989),  in their reviews of the empirical literature, conclude that the effect of concentration on 
innovation varies across industries,  and the sign of the relationship can be both positive and negative. Although 
addressing our finding of a positive association between markups and innovation is beyond the scope of the paper, 
we conjecture that this finding captures the fact that firms need resources to innovate,  and with largely under-
developed capital markets in emerging market economies, markups provide funding for innovative activities. 
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III.  Econometric Issues and Robustness Checks
In this section, we carry out a battery of econometric and measurement checks to 
verify that our results are robust. The baseline specification potentially has endoge-
neity issues given our firm-level measures of competition and transfer of capabilities. 
Therefore, we estimate our model using instrumental variables for foreign pressure. 
As our key instrument, we construct an index of barriers to entry based on firms’ 
responses about regulations. We validate the index using external information on 
firm survival, turnover, and profitability rates. We also carry out a robustness check 
for our Mahalanobis measure of the distance to the frontier and report the results of 
several other robustness tests that exploit the panel data in the BEEPS
A. Endogeneity of Foreign competition
Is the innovative activity being spurred by the foreign competition or is the pres-
sure from foreign competition the result of the innovative activity? Unfortunately, 
economic theory does not make clear predictions about the sign of the resulting bias 
of the regression coefficients. Both positive and negative feedback between competi-
tion and innovation are possible. If, for example, firms successfully innovate, they 
may be able to prevent entry of new firms into the market (as noted, for example, 
by Aghion et al. 2005, and Richard Blundell, Rachel Griffith, and John Van Reenen 
1999). The same endogeneity problem may exist with markup. Another source of 
correlation between competition and error term in our regression can be measure-
ment error, which leads to attenuation bias.
Variables that capture the regulation of an industry might be considered good 
instrumental variables (IV) for competition in general, and for foreign pressure in 
particular, since they affect entry of new firms, but not necessarily innovative activ-
ity. BEEPS provide several questions about regulations, of which we selected the 
following two.
Q1. Thinking now of unofficial payments/gifts that a firm like yours 
would make in a given year, could you please tell me how often would 
they make payments/gifts for the following purposes [score on 1 (Never) 
to 6 (Always) scale]:
 a) To obtain business licenses and permits;
 b) To deal with occupational health and safety inspections;
 c) To deal with fire and building inspections;
 d) To deal with environmental inspections;
 e) To influence the content of new legislation, rules, decrees, etc.
Q2. Can you tell me how problematic are these different factors for the 
operation and growth of your business [score on 1 (No obstacle) to 4 
(Major obstacle) scale]:
 a) Access to land;
 b) Title or leasing of land;
 c) Customs and trade regulations;
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 d) Business licensing and permits;
 e) Labor regulations.
The advantage of these questions is that they provide a measure of entry barriers 
at the firm level, in contrast to the previous literature, which used more aggregated 
variables such as movements in exchange rates and changes in tariffs (e.g., Marianne 
Bertrand 2004; Aghion et al. 2005). This difference is important because variability 
at the firm level dwarfs variability at the macroeconomic level, and thus our instru-
ments are much more informative. At the same time, Q1 and Q2, by capturing bar-
riers to entry, preserve the spirit of the instrumental variables used in the previous 
literature.
Any given sub-question may be a weak instrument because it captures only one 
facet of barriers to entry and does not provide a holistic picture of impediments to 
entry. Therefore, we construct an “index of barriers to entry” by normalizing firm’s 
answers to each question to have the same scale and variability (a standard deviation 
of one), and then summing up the normalized responses across all questions (Q1a–
Q1e, Q2a–Q2e) for each firm.21 This index provides a simple transparent summary 
statistic for various impediments that firms face in starting or operating a business. 
Larger values of the index are interpreted as higher barriers to entry.
To verify that this statistic provides a meaningful measure of barriers to entry, 
we regressed measures of firm profitability (from BEEPS) as well as industry-level 
entry, survival, and firm turnover (from Eric Bartelsman, John Haltiwanger, and 
Stefano Scarpetta 2004) on the index. The results, reported in Table 2, suggest that 
a larger value of our index is associated with a higher incidence of positive profits 
and lower firm turnover (and entry rate in particular), as well as higher firm survival 
rates. All of these findings are consistent with industries being more protected when 
the index is higher. We conclude that the index captures barriers to entry and, hence, 
we may expect it to serve as a reasonable instrumental variable for pressure from 
foreign competition.
We also include the average response about foreign pressure of all other firms in 
the same industry/country/year as an instrument. This instrument is aimed at fixing 
the attenuation bias since the average response of firms in a country-industry-year 
cell is less likely to be contaminated with the measurement error.
The IV results are presented in Table 3. We find that our instruments have good 
statistical properties. The first-stage F-statistic suggests that excluded variables have 
strong predictive power for pressure from foreign competition. Likewise Anderson’s 
canonical correlation test rejects the null that the instruments are irrelevant. The 
point estimates in the IV convey the same message we had from standard probit 
estimates; greater pressure from foreign competition spurs innovation in introducing 
new products and adopting new technologies, and it has no effect on certification.
21 We also explored an alternative strategy when we chose instruments using formal statistical selection cri-
teria developed by Donald W. K. Andrews (1999) and Alastair R. Hall and Fernanda P. M. Peixe (2003). These 
criteria select correctly excluded variables with strong predictive power in the first stage. The results with this 
alternative strategy are qualitatively similar to those that we present in the paper. 
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The relative magnitudes of the IV and standard probit estimates deserve some dis-
cussion. We believe there are two explanations for the relatively large IV estimates. 
First, if our IV is correcting for measurement error in foreign competition, it should 
remove attenuation bias and result in a larger coefficient. This correction would be 
large only if the size of the signal-to-noise ratio is relatively small. Although the 
signal-to-noise ratio necessary to explain this big increase in the estimate is on the 
Table 2—Barriers to Entry and Firm Turnover








Index of barriers to entry −0.010*** −0.953*** 0.904** −0.190**
(0.003) (0.181) (0.440) (0.081)
Observations 8,248 59 62 60
Notes: The table reports separate correlations of our “index of barriers to entry” (described in Section III) with 
firm profitability, and rates of firm turnover, survival, and entry. In all specifications, country and industry fixed 
effects are included, but not reported. The dependent variable in the probit specification (first column) is equal 
to one if a firm reported no (zero) profits and equal to zero otherwise. Year fixed effects are also included, but 
not reported, in the probit equation. The firm turnover, entry rates, and firm survival rate, from Bartelsman, 
Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2004), are provided for the following five transition countries at the 2-digit NACE 
industry level: Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, Romania, and Slovenia. For these specifications, barriers to entry are 
measured as the median response in a given country and industry. Turnover, survival and entry rates are in per-
cent. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table 3—Instrumented versus Noninstrumented Estimates of Foreign Competition and Markup
New product New technology New accreditation
Pressure from foreign competition 0.546*** 0.518*** 0.380*** 0.296*** −0.076 −0.098
(0.080) (0.101) (0.089) (0.097) (0.114) (0.125)
Markup 1.421* 1.973*** 0.477
(0.780) (0.749) (0.930)
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic 126.8*** 54.3*** 127.6*** 54.9*** 127.0*** 54.7***
Anderson canonical corr. LM 
statistic
249.4*** 161.6*** 250.8*** 163.4*** 249.7*** 162.6***
First stage fit, F-statistic
 Markup 111.5*** 106.7*** 110.8***
 Foreign pressure 126.8*** 84.9*** 127.6*** 85.5*** 127.0*** 85.0***
Observations 11,003 11,003 10,913 10,913 10,966 10,966
Notes: The table reports estimates of equation (1), where location, time, country, and industry fixed effects, as well 
as other controls are included, but not reported. IV probit is implemented as in Newey (1987). The null hypothesis 
for tests based on the Anderson canonical correlation LM statistic is that the matrix of reduced form coefficients 
does not have full rank (i.e., the system is under-identified). Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic tests the null of weak 
instruments. First stage fit F-statistic reports the values of the F-statistic for the null that coefficients on excluded 
variables (instruments) in the first stage are jointly equal to zero. In the specifications that exclude markup, the 
instruments are barriers to entry and the response of other firms to the question about foreign pressure in the 
same industry/country/year cell. In the specifications that include markup, the instruments are augmented with 
the response of other firms to the question about markup in the same industry/country/year cell. Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses. The asterisks at the first stage F-statistic and the Anderson canonical correlation LM 
statistic show the significance level at which the corresponding null hypothesis is rejected.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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high-end of the range for subjective assessments in surveys, it is not implausible 
especially given that responses are based on a discrete scale.22
Second, foreign pressure could be particularly strong for stagnant industries (typi-
cally industries dominated by old firms), and since stagnant (old) industries tend to 
innovate less (as seen in Table 1), this would lead to a negative correlation between 
foreign competition and the error term in equation (1). This would result in a nega-
tive bias in the OLS estimates, which the IV estimate corrects. Although we do not 
have a measure of how stagnant an industry is, this account is indirectly supported 
by the data. In particular, there is a strong positive correlation between the average 
age of firms in an industry and reported foreign pressure. Furthermore, older firms 
appear to be crowded out by foreign firms, i.e., as foreign pressure increases in an 
industry (measured as the share of output in an industry produced by foreign firms), 
the average age of the firms declines. In order to present conservative estimates, we 
continue with the OLS approach.
B. robustness of the distance Measure
To test the robustness of the Mahalanobis distance measure, we reestimate the 
baseline equation with a measure that captures differences in efficiency using the 
total factor productivity (TFP). We compute TFP using the cost share for labor, 
material, and capital (computed for each firm and aggregated for a given industry in 
each country and year), and adjust it for capacity utilization (CU),
(2)  ln TFPisct = ln Yisct −  
_
 s sc L ln Lisct −  
_
 s sc M ln Misct −  
_
 s sc k ln kisct − ln cUisct,
where i, s, c, and t index firms, industries, countries, and time;  
_
 s sc L ,  
_
 s sc M ,  
_
 s sc k , are labor, 
materials, and capital cost shares; Y is sales; L is number of employees; M is the 
value of materials; and k is the replacement value of capital. We then estimate the 
TFP-based distance measure as the difference between log TFP of the top third of 
the most efficient foreign firms in a given industry and country, and log TFP of each 
domestic firm in the same industry and country.23
Since only about one-half of the firms report sales revenue, and even fewer report 
capital, our TFP-measure is available for only 5,548 firm observations. Despite 
this, we find that the coefficients on TFP-based distance are similar to those of the 
Mahalanobis distance in suggesting that there is a negative and significant relation-
ship between distance and innovation (Table 4). Hence, our basic results are robust 
22 To put this discussion into perspective, consider the size of measurement errors reported in other surveys. 
A common way to get a lower bound on the measurement error is to check the test-retest correlation (where the 
same question is asked after a period of time). In this simple check (typically within one hour or one day), the cor-
relation between test-retest responses is about 0.3–0.5, which implies that the signal to noise ratio has to be about 
½. (See Alan B. Krueger and David A. Schkade 2008 for a brief survey of measurement errors in measures of 
well-being.) Given that test-retest correlations are typically estimated for a very short period of time, it is entirely 
plausible that as the time between test-retest questions expands, the correlation falls, since some respondents will 
find it harder to recall what they reported in the first-round question. 
23 Similar to computing the Mahalanobis distance, the top third of foreign firms is defined as the set of firms 
with TFP above the sixty-sixth percentile. 
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to alternative measures of the distance from the frontier. Because we lose so many 
observations with the TFP-based measure of distance, we use the Mahalanobis dis-
tance throughout the paper with the exception of this section.
C. reverse causality and the Timing of Measurement of Variables
Our variables for competition, vertical transfer of capabilities, and distance are 
reported in the years of the survey (2002 and 2005), while innovation is measured 
over the preceding three-year periods (1999–2002 and 2002–2005, respectively). As 
a result, there is a potential problem that the causality runs from the dependent vari-
able to the explanatory variables such that, for example, firms that have innovated 
are able to sell more to MNEs than firms that have not innovated. We address this 
potential problem in two ways.
First, the reverse causality is less of a problem if the values of the explanatory 
variables in question (sMNEs, export, import, and Forcomp) do not vary much over 
a given three-year period. Within the subsample of about 1,000 BEEPS firms for 
which we could link the 2002 and 2005 survey data and create a panel, the correla-
tion coefficients between the 2002 and 2005 values of exports, imports, and sMNE, 
respectively, are relatively high (0.95, 0.93 and 0.42, respectively). The pressure from 
foreign competition is a categorical variable, and the probability of reporting the 
same value (staying in the same group) is about 50 percent. Hence, these coefficients 
show considerable persistence, especially when one considers that a number of the 
variables are expressed as shares.
Table 4—Baseline Specification for All Firms Using TFP-Based Distance
New product New technology New accreditation
Competition
 Pressure from foreign competition 0.052*** 0.061*** 0.021
(0.019) (0.019) (0.023)
Vertical transfer of capability
 Share of sales to MNEs 0.458*** 0.311*** 0.409***
(0.108) (0.097) (0.108)
 Export share 0.286** 0.190* 0.360***
(0.112) (0.101) (0.112)
 Import share 0.418*** 0.242*** 0.180**
(0.059) (0.058) (0.072)
Ability
 Distance (TFP) −0.031** −0.026* −0.044***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.017)
Observations 5,094 5,032 5,054
Notes: The table reports estimates of equation (1), where location, time, country, and industry fixed effects, as 
well as other controls are included, but not reported. Definitions of the variables are in Appendix Table A1. TFP 
is calculated using equation (2). TFP-based distance is the log difference between the average of the top third 
within a given country/industry/year cell foreign firms’ TFP and that of a domestic firm. Robust standard errors 
are in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
VoL. 2 No. 2 213GorodNichENko ET AL.: GLoBALizATioN ANd iNNoVATioN
Second, we replicate our estimates on the panel subsample of BEEPS firms, which 
allows us to regress innovation measured for the period 2002–2005 on the 2002 values 
of competition, vertical transfers, and distance from the frontier (using both the TFP-
based and Mahalanobis measures). By construction, these “initial value” regressions 
eliminate the possibility that the relationship between a firm’s innovation and competi-
tion, vertical transfers, and distance from the frontier is brought about by contempo-
raneous shocks to these variables, or by reverse causality. However, because the panel 
subsample is much smaller than the entire sample, we must use a more parsimonious 
specification. Therefore, we check whether and how our findings are affected by the 
change in specification and the smaller sample size. In particular, we include only 
the country and industry fixed effects as control variables and exclude the nine con-
trol variables in equation (1). Moreover, we include competition by itself. Finally, the 
majority of the non-zero values in the share of sales to MNEs, share of exports, and 
share of imports variables are close to unity (greater than 90 percent). Hence, also 
taking into account the small sample size, we convert these variables from shares into 
dummy variables, where zero means no sales to MNEs, exports, etc.
In order to assess what drives the difference, if any, between the estimates from 
the full sample and panel data, we estimate the more parsimonious specification for 
various samples:
 (a)  the full sample, using pooled 2002 and 2005 data on all firms and cur-
rent (contemporaneous) values of the explanatory variables, as in the base 
specification;
 (b)  the pooled 2002 and 2005 data on the panel of firms, using current values of 
the explanatory variables;
 (c)  the 2005 data on the panel of firms, using current values of the explanatory 
variables; and
 (d)  the 2005 data on the panel of firms, using three-year lagged values of the 
explanatory variables.
The model in (a) reveals whether the more parsimonious specification applied to 
the full sample yields similar results to those in the base specification reported in 
Table 1. It also provides a benchmark against which to compare the estimates from 
the panel subsample. The estimation in (b) is identical to that in (a), except that it uses 
the panel subsample of firms. Comparing the estimates in (b) to those in (a) permits 
us to establish whether, for the purposes of our study, the panel is a representative 
subsample of the full sample. The estimation in (c) is identical to (b), but uses only the 
2005 part (i.e., the more recent half) of the panel. Comparing the estimates in (c) to 
those from (b) permits us to infer how much significance, if any, we lose by using only 
the more recent half of the panel data observations. Finally, the results in (d) represent 
the ideal specification, which explains innovation over the 2002–2005 period with 
the lagged (2002) values of the explanatory variables.24 Comparing the results in (c) 
24 This uses data from the 2005 part of the panel for the dependent variable and data from the 2002 part of the 
panel for the explanatory variables.
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and (d) enables us to assess the difference in the estimated coefficients between the 
specifications using the current versus the lagged values of the explanatory variables.
The coefficients from each of these four specifications are presented in Table 5 for 
the competition, transfer of capability, and distance variables. First, a comparison 
of the coefficients in column 1 of each panel in Table 5 to the coefficients in Table 1 
indicates that applying the more parsimonious model to the full sample yields simi-
lar coefficient signs, point estimates, and significance on all the variables, with the 
only notable difference being that the coefficients on pressure from foreign competi-
tion are somewhat larger in the parsimonious specification.
A comparison of the results in column 1 with column 2 in each of the three pan-
els of Table 5 indicates that going from over 11,500 observations in the full pooled 
sample to about 2,000 observations in the pooled panel data, holding constant the 
specification, maintains the signs and, in most instances, also maintains the signifi-
cance of the key coefficients.
Comparing columns 2 and 3 in each of the three panels of Table 5 demonstrates 
that going from the 2,000 pooled panel observations for 2002 and 2005 to 1,000 
observations for 2005 (but estimating the same equation which still has contem-
poraneous values of the independent variables) maintains all signs and reduces the 
significance of just two coefficients.25 Finally, moving from columns 3 to 4, i.e., 
using the lagged (2002) rather than the current (2005) values of the explanatory 
variables with the 2005 panel observations, reduces the significance on three and 
increases the significance on another two of the 24 coefficients. Interestingly, in the 
two cases in which the coefficients become significant (sMNE for New Product and 
New Technology), they also become similar to the corresponding coefficients in the 
full sample estimates in column 1 of Table 5 and the corresponding coefficients in 
the base model in Table 1.
In view of the recent literature about reverse causality in the relationship between 
exporting and the efficiency of firms (see e.g., Melitz 2003), we take an additional 
step in assessing whether there is evidence of reverse causality in the relationship 
between exporting and innovation. For the export share, we can construct t − 3 
 values using retrospective questions about growth rates of export (including the first 
year of export status) and sales, as well as the current year information on the export 
share in total sales and the level of sales. The estimated coefficients (not reported in 
tabular form) are nearly identical to the results reported in the baseline specification: 
0.311 for new product, 0.257 for new technology, and 0.450 for new accreditation (all 
significant at 1 percent). We can conclude that firms that exported a larger share of 
their sales three years ago are more likely to be innovating today.26
Overall, the results in Table 5 suggest that using the large pooled sample of 2002 
and 2005 data with the current values of the competition, transfer of capability, and 
distance variables is a reasonable empirical strategy that does not generate major 
biases in the estimated coefficients.
25 The number of observations in the panel drops to 1,000 because of missing variables.
26 We do not use this measure in our analysis because many firms are reluctant to report the level of sales, 
and the sample size for the regressions based on export share dated at t−3 shrinks to about 6,000 observations.
VoL. 2 No. 2 215GorodNichENko ET AL.: GLoBALizATioN ANd iNNoVATioN
Table 5—Testing for Endogeneity Due to the Timing of the Variables
Full sample 
(current)






(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. New product
Pressure from foreign competition 0.109*** 0.048* 0.061** 0.084**
(0.011) (0.028) (0.030) (0.039)
Vertical transfer    
 Sales to MNEs 0.308*** 0.356*** 0.191 0.305***
(0.033) (0.083) (0.120) (0.108)
 Export share 0.296*** 0.463*** 0.444*** 0.371***
(0.032) (0.084) (0.115) (0.116)
 Import share 0.368*** 0.338*** 0.319*** 0.182**
(0.025) (0.061) (0.088) (0.086)
Distance        
 Distance (Mahalanobis) −0.075** −0.129** −0.121* −0.117
(0.020) (0.053) (0.072) (0.075)
 Distance (TFP) −0.039*** −0.092*** −0.064* −0.072*
(0.012) (0.027) (0.041) (0.041)
Panel B. New technology
Pressure from foreign competition 0.100*** 0.053* 0.113*** 0.072*
(0.011) (0.028) (0.040) (0.039)
Vertical transfer    
 Sales to MNEs 0.213*** 0.158** 0.065 0.264**
(0.032) (0.079) (0.119) (0.108)
 Export share 0.213*** 0.204*** 0.315*** 0.189*
(0.031) (0.076) (0.109) (0.110)
 Import share 0.307*** 0.255*** 0.283*** 0.146
(0.026) (0.064) (0.092) (0.091)
Distance        
 Distance (Mahalanobis) −0.076*** −0.044 −0.051 −0.054
(0.021) (0.052) (0.073) (0.073)
 Distance (TFP) −0.035*** −0.069** −0.062* −0.067*
(0.012) (0.025) (0.037) (0.038)
Panel c: New Accreditation 
Pressure from foreign competition 0.108*** 0.099*** 0.065 0.059 
(0.014) (0.033) (0.048) (0.045) 
Vertical transfer    
 Sales to MNEs 0.344*** 0.374*** 0.294** 0.366***
(0.033) (0.079) (0.122) (0.109)
 Export share 0.423*** 0.494*** 0.466*** 0.442***
(0.033) (0.079) (0.112) (0.114)
 Import share 0.212*** 0.190*** 0.298*** 0.125
(0.028) (0.067) (0.098) (0.094)
Distance        
 Distance (Mahalanobis) −0.095*** −0.046 −0.036 −0.026
(0.025) (0.066) (0.096) (0.096)
 Distance (TFP) −0.060*** −0.026 −0.002 −0.005
(0.014) (0.030) (0.043) (0.044)
Notes: Pressure from foreign competition enters the regressions separately. Vertical transfer of capability (sales to 
MNEs, export, import), Mahalanobis Distance and TFP-based Distance enter the regressions separately. Sales to 
MNEs, export share, and import share are set as dummy variables equal to one for positive values. Full Sample is 
with current RHS values; 2002 and 2005 panel is with current RHS values; 2005 panel is with both current and 
lagged RHS values. The coefficients in column 1 differs from the corresponding entries in Table 1 because other 
controls in Table 5 are excluded. Location type, time, country, and industry fixed effects are included, but not 
reported. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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IV.  Additional Findings
In this section, we proceed with testing the remaining prediction (i)d outlined at 
the beginning of this paper, namely whether the effects of competition and vertical 
transfer of capabilities on innovation vary with the efficiency level of firms. Given 
the nature of our data, unlike other studies, we are able to estimate these effects 
separately for manufacturing and services, and see if the results are materially dif-
ferent across these two sectors.
A. Firm heterogeneity and innovation
The key prediction from the Aghion et al. (2004, 2005) models is that firms closer 
to the frontier are spurred by competition to innovate, while those far from the fron-
tier are discouraged from innovating (prediction (i)d at the beginning of this paper). 
In order to test this prediction, we estimate equation (1) separately for three groups 
of firms, according to where they lie in the Mahalanobis distance to the frontier—
the closest one-third (“close”), middle one-third (“middle”) and farthest one-third 
(“far”).
Examining the coefficients on pressure from foreign competition in the close, 
middle, and far columns of Table 6, we find no systematic support for this hypothe-
sis. Increases in foreign competition spur product and technology innovation among 
firms that are “close to” as well as “far from” the frontier at about the same rate and 
for both sets of firms, it has no effect on accreditation.
A key hypothesis with respect to the relationship between vertical transfer of 
capabilities and innovation found in the FDI spillover literature is that firms closer 
to the frontier are in a better position than firms farther from the frontier to imi-
tate (absorb) the technology of foreign firms. As may be seen from Table 6, we do 
not find support for this hypothesis in any of our three vertical transfer variables. 
Virtually all the coefficients are highly significant and, for most cases one cannot 
reject the hypothesis that the effects are the same for firms that are close to and far 
from the efficiency frontier.
In sum, Sutton’s (2007a) prediction that the vertical transfer of capability is an 
important phenomenon is strongly supported, and the effect seems to be strong 
across the board irrespective of the relative efficiency of domestic firms. However, 
we do not find support for an inverted U relationship or for the prediction that firms 
further from the frontier are discouraged from innovating by competition, while 
firms close to the frontier are spurred by competition to innovate.
B. Manufacturing versus services
Finally, we note that the effects of globalization may vary across different sectors 
of the economy if, for example, one sector comprises primarily tradables and the 
other nontradables. We therefore test whether the innovation effects of competition 
and vertical linkages with foreign firms are different for firms in manufacturing than 
for those in services. This manufacturing-service sector distinction is also useful 
because the service sector is rapidly gaining in importance in many emerging market 
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Table 6—Testing for the Interaction between Distance and Competition
Distance to the Frontier
Close Middle Far
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A. New product
Competition
 Pressure from foreign competition 0.071*** 0.022 0.053**
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023)
Vertical transfer of capability
 Share of sales to MNEs 0.162 0.358*** 0.277**
 (0.121) (0.131) (0.116)
 Export share 0.268* 0.180 0.382***
 (0.139) (0.142) (0.137)
 Import share 0.411*** 0.250*** 0.447***
 (0.071) (0.067) (0.068)
Observations 3,746 3,695 3,637
Panel B: New technology
Competition
 Pressure from foreign competition 0.058** 0.060*** 0.056**
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Vertical transfer of capability
 Share of sales to MNEs 0.297** 0.243* 0.204*
 (0.121) (0.126) (0.109)
 Export share 0.293** 0.111 0.343***
 (0.130) (0.134) (0.127)
 Import share 0.264*** 0.288*** 0.309***
 (0.071) (0.071) (0.066)
Observations 3,714 3,665 3,609
Panel c: New Accreditation 
Competition
 Pressure from foreign competition 0.016 −0.026 0.026
(0.028) (0.030) (0.029)
Vertical transfer of capability
 Share of sales to MNEs 0.363*** 0.590*** 0.319**
 (0.131) (0.148) (0.124)
 Export share 0.415*** 0.489*** 0.661***
 (0.142) (0.150) (0.147)
 Import share 0.249*** 0.208** 0.262***
 (0.089) (0.097) (0.089)
Observations 3,718 3,685 3,613
Notes: The table reports estimates of equation (1), where location, time, country, and industry fixed effects as 
well as other controls are included, but not reported. Definitions of the variables are in Appendix Table A1. Close 
denotes the lowest third of firms in terms of distance to foreign firms. Far denotes the greatest third of firms 
in terms of distance to foreign firms. Location, time, country, and industry fixed effects are included, but not 
reported. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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economies, and existing studies of FDI and innovation have almost invariably had 
access only to data on manufacturing, and thus failed to analyze services. The esti-
mates in Table 7 indicate that there is not much difference in the innovation effect 
of foreign competition between firms in manufacturing and services. The effects of 
vertical transfer of capabilities are very similar in manufacturing and services. The 
results indicate that the effect of globalization is broad-based and relatively similar 
in firms that produce goods and firms that generate services.
V.  Concluding Remarks
Motivated by the growing theoretical literature on globalization and innovation, 
as well as the limited empirical evidence in this area, we use rich firm-level data 
from the 27 emerging market economies (primarily postcommunist countries) to test 
predictions about the effects of foreign competition, and vertical linkages with for-
eign firms, on domestic firms’ innovative activities. We focus on innovation because 
it is a key channel through which firms in emerging markets try to become and 
stay competitive, and existing literature concentrates primarily on the productivity 
effects of globalization, assuming (but not showing) that the mechanism underlying 
these effects is innovation.
Our main findings are that: greater pressure from foreign competition stimulates 
innovation by domestic firms in emerging market economies; supplying multina-
tionals, as well as exporting and importing (vertical relationships), induce innova-
tion; there is no evidence for an inverted U relationship between innovation and 
competition; and the relationship between globalization and innovation does not 
vary across the manufacturing and service sectors or with the distance to the tech-
nological frontier.
Our first set of findings provides robust evidence of the positive relationship 
between foreign competition and innovation in emerging market economies, an area 
that has been under-researched. Our second set of findings provides empirical sup-
port for the view of Sutton (2007a) and others who argue that emerging market 
economies benefit from globalization through the vertical transfer of capability from 
foreign to domestic firms. We find this effect to be substantial for all three types of 
innovation that we study, suggesting that the supply chain of multinational enter-
prises and international trade are an important means for domestic firms to raise 
their capability. Our third and fourth set of findings indicate that the effects of glo-
balization on innovation are all-encompassing, rather than affecting only a subset 
of firms.
The implication of these findings is that policy measures stimulating foreign direct 
investment and international trade enhance domestic welfare through greater inno-
vative activities of domestic firms. We provide a solid basis for policies that focus 
on facilitating innovation through both foreign competition and vertical linkages 
in a broad spectrum of domestic firms—not just those in manufacturing or that are 
technologically more advanced. Our finding that vertical linkages with foreign firms 
stimulate innovation provides the missing mechanism for (and is consistent with) 
the literature on the effects of FDI on productivity. Our result that foreign competi-
tion spurs innovation appears to be at odds with this FDI literature, which generally 
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Table 7—Testing for Response in Manufacturing versus Services
Manufacturing Services
(1) (2)
Panel A. New product
Competition
 Pressure from foreign competition 0.048** 0.060***
(0.022) (0.018)
Vertical transfer of capability
 Share of sales to MNEs 0.289** 0.197*
(0.119) (0.106)
 Export share 0.283** 0.264**
(0.121) (0.122)
 Import share 0.469*** 0.275***
(0.073) (0.054)
Observations 3,756 5,297
Panel B. New technology
Competition
 Pressure from foreign competition 0.041** 0.070***
(0.020) (0.020)
Vertical transfer of capability
 Share of sales to MNEs 0.311*** 0.275**
(0.106) (0.109)
 Export share 0.289*** 0.226*
(0.104) (0.126)
 Import share 0.254*** 0.277***
(0.065) (0.059)
Observations 3,723 5,260
Panel c. New Accreditation
Competition
 Pressure from foreign competition 0.007 0.041
(0.025) (0.027)
Vertical transfer of capability
 Share of sales to MNEs 0.411*** 0.477***
(0.112) (0.133)
 Export share 0.417*** 0.716***
(0.113) (0.142)
 Import share 0.278*** 0.139*
(0.079) (0.082)
Observations 3,737 5,284
Notes: The table reports estimates of equation (1), where location, time, country, and industry 
fixed effects, as well as other controls are included, but not reported. Definitions of the vari-
ables are in Appendix Table A1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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finds that higher foreign competition, when measured in a relatively aggregate form 
as higher “presence of foreign firms” in an industry, has a negative or no significant 
impact on efficiency of domestic firms in developing countries (see e.g., Gorg and 
Greenaway 2004). We hypothesize that this discrepancy may be arising because we 
measure foreign competition at the firm level, while the FDI literature has generally 
used aggregate measures, such as the share of foreign output or employment in an 
industry. In future research, it will be desirable to reconcile these conflicting find-
ings by using firm-level rather than industry-level measures of foreign competition 
in the productivity studies.
Appendix 
Table A1—Definition of Variables
Variable name Variable definition BEEPS question
Newproduct New product or upgrade 
existing product
Dummy variable. Has your company undertaken any of the 
following initiatives over the last 36 months? Dummy variable 
is equal to one if ‘yes’ to any of the two questions:
- Developed successfully a major new product line
- Upgraded an existing product line
Newtech New technology is 
implemented
Dummy variable = 1 if answer is affirmative to question: Has 




Dummy variable = 1 if answer is affirmative to question:
Has your company obtained a new quality accreditation (ISO 
9001, 9002 or 14,000, AGCCP, etc.) over the last 36 months? 
ForComp Pressure from foreign 
competition
How would you rate the importance of pressure from foreign 
competition on key decisions about your business with respect 
to “Reducing the production costs of existing products or 
services”:
  None Not important
  Low Slightly important
  Medium Fairly important
  High Very important
SMNE Share of sales to MNEs Share of sales to multinationals located in your country (not 
including your parent company, if applicable)
EXPORT Export share Share of sales exported directly or indirectly through a 
distributor
IMPORT Import share Share of your firm’s material inputs and supplies that are 
imported directly or indirectly through a distributor
L Labor Number of permanent and temporary employees 36 month ago
CU Capacity utilization Level of utilization of facilities/man power relative to the 
maximum output possible using its facilities/man power at the 
time
K Capital The estimate of the replacement value of the physical 
production assets used by your firm (land, building, 
equipment) 
M Materials The estimate of the material input costs and bought in 
components/services corresponding to your firm’s total sales
(continued)
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Table A1—Definition of Variables (continued)
Variable name     Variable definition BEEPS question
SKILL Share of skilled workers, 
3 years ago
What share of your current permanent, full-time workers were 
skilled workers 36 months ago?
EDU Share of workers with
higher education, 
3 years ago
What share of the workforce at your firm had some university 
education 36 months ago?
Age Log (firm’s age) Year of survey minus the year when the firm was established 
(minimum age is two years). For the year established: In what 
year did your firm begin operations in this country?
SOE State owned Government is the major shareholder (50 percent+)
CNM Compete in national  
markets 
Does your firm compete in the national market (i.e., whole 
country) for its main product line or service or does it serve 
primarily the local market (i.e., region, city, or neighborhood)? 
Yes = 1
LOC Location Type of location: capital; other city over 1 million; other 
250,000–1,000,000; Other 50,000–250,000; Under 50,000
Markup Markup Considering your main product line or main line of services 
in the domestic market, by what margin does your sales price 
exceed your operating costs (i.e., the cost of material inputs 
plus wage costs but not overhead and depreciation)?
Table A2—Summary Statistics
Mean SD
Innovation variables   
 New product 0.562 0.496
 New technology 0.302 0.459
 New accreditation 0.129 0.335
Competition   
 Pressure from foreign competition 2.017 1.121
Vertical transfer of capability   
 Share of sales to MNEs 0.066 0.196
 Export share 0.069 0.187
 Import share 0.258 0.359
Ability   
 Distance (Mahalanobis) 3.034 0.706
 Distance (TFP) 0.364 0.377
Controls   
 ln L, 3 years ago 3.000 1.604
 (ln L)2, 3 years ago 11.577 11.530
 Share of skilled workers, 3 years ago 0.487 0.309
 Share of workers with university education, 3 years ago 0.272 0.290
 Firm’s age 2.367 0.777
 State owned 0.118 0.322
 Compete in national markets 0.667 0.471
 Markup 0.209 0.118
Location   
 Capital 0.313 0.464
 Other, over 1 million 0.060 0.237
 Other, 250,000–1,000,000 0.157 0.364
 Other, 50,000–250,000 0.224 0.417
 Under 50,000 0.241 0.428
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Table A3—Baseline Specification for All Firms; 
Marginal Effects Evaluated at Means
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A. New product
Competition   
 Pressure from foreign competition 0.019*** 0.044* 0.019***
(0.005) (0.027) (0.005)
 (Pressure from foreign competition)2 −0.005 
(0.006) 
Vertical transfer of capability   
 Share of sales to MNEs 0.104*** 0.103*** 0.102***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
 Export share 0.116*** 0.116*** 0.116***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
 Import share 0.147*** 0.147*** 0.147***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Ability   
 Distance (Mahalanobis) −0.015* −0.015* −0.016*
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Controls   
 ln L, t−3 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.050***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
 (ln L)2, t−3 −0.002 −0.002 −0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
 Share of skilled workers, t−3 0.008 0.008 0.007
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
 Share of workers with university ed. t−3 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.090***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
 Firm’s age −0.022*** −0.022*** −0.020***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
 State owned dummy −0.093*** −0.093*** −0.092***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018)




Observations 11,078 11,078 11,078
(continued)
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Table A3—Baseline Specification for All Firms; 
Marginal Effects Evaluated at Means (continued)
(1) (2) (3)
Panel B. New technology
Competition   
 Pressure from foreign competition 0.019*** 0.046** 0.019***
(0.004) (0.023) (0.004)
 (Pressure from foreign competition)2 −0.006 
(0.005) 
Vertical transfer of capability   
 Share of sales to MNEs 0.084*** 0.084*** 0.085***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
 Export share 0.085*** 0.085*** 0.085***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
 Import share 0.099*** 0.099*** 0.099***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Ability   
 Distance (Mahalanobis) −0.013* −0.013* −0.013*
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Controls   
 ln L, t−3 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.043***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
 (ln L)2, t−3 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
 Share of skilled workers, t−3 −0.005 −0.005 −0.005
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
 Share of workers with university ed. t−3 0.069*** 0.068*** 0.069***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
 Firm’s age −0.017** −0.017** −0.017**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
 State owned dummy −0.037** −0.037** −0.037**
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)




Observations 10,991 10,991 10,991
(continued)
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*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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